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Unofficial Report 
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for review of a decision of a panel of 
the Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Bench, Garff, and Jackson (herein "Panel"). 
The Panel's decision affirmed dismissal of this action by the trial court. It was filed 
June 7, 1990, and rehearing was denied August 6, 1990. The Supreme Court has 
discretionary jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to §78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code and 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This petition presents the following questions: 
1. Whether this petition presents important questions of municipal law which 
have not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
2. Whether the Appeal Court Panel applied a standard of review in conflict 
with standards adopted by the Supreme Court. 
3. Whether the Panel held as determinative statutes which have no 
application to this action. 
3. Whether the Panel's decision was rendered without benefit of briefing and 
argument so as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision to 
correct resulting errors. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES. AND ORDINANCES 
Determinative statutes include §§10-1-104(1), 10-1-104(11), 10-2-401, 10-2-418, 
10-9-9, 10-9-15, and 17-27-16, and are set forth in Appendix "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed by Sandy City to challenge Salt Lake County's conditional 
use approval of 4.18 acre commercial development in an unincorporated island within 
Sandy's boundaries. State statutes restrict such projects adjacent to city boundaries 
where development costs exceed $750,000. Motions for summary judgment were filed by 
all parties in the district court. The City also moved to strike certain of defendant's 
affidavits and documents and filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit in support of additional 
discovery time. The City's motions were denied and summary judgment was entered for 
defendants. 
On June 7, 1990, a Panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
judgment.1 The Panel based its decision on an issue which had not been previously 
considered, briefed or argued. It erroneously found that the City had not properly 
appealed a County rezoning of the property prior to the County's conditional use 
approval. The Panel also applied standards of review which gave undue deference to 
County discretion in determining its own jurisdictional limits. The City's Petition for 
Rehearing was denied on August 6, 1990. The petition and the order of denial are 
attached hereto as Appendix "C" and "D," respectively. 
The following undisputed facts demonstrate that the City did properly object to 
and appeal the County's rezoning: 
1. Prior to any rezoning decision, the County sent the City a copy of the 
rezoning application and requested its recommendation. R15-17. The zoning application 
omitted the estimate of project value required by the application form. But it did admit 
that the rezoning would not comply with the County's current land use plan. R15. The 
City augmented this admission by its own written objection stating that the plan also 
violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and Crescent Community Citizen's Report. R17. 
The Panel's opinion is is set forth in Appendix MB." 
2 
5, Document 9, p. 1114. 
2. A sketch of the project site was apparently available at the time of 
rezoning. Envelope 6 #21. However, there was "not a specific use proposed for the 
overall properties" at the time the application was made or when rezoning was 
considered. R15; Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904. Value would not be determined 
until a building permit was actually issued. R i l l ; Envelope 4, Document 6, p.13. It 
would have been impossible for the City to have estimated the cost of development at 
that time.2 Nevertheless, the scale was sufficient to cause the City to inform the County 
that "[t]he developer should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." R17. 
3. There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing 
and its representatives did not attend.3 Nevertheless, the County Commission was 
briefed at the hearing on Sandy's objection to the rezoning. Envelope 5, document 6. 
The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that there may be a problem with 
the project meeting the urban development restrictions of section 10-2-418 U.C.A, 
depending on how the development plans were eventually presented. He concluded that 
"Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the time the plans were submitted. 
Envelope 5, document 6, p. 906. 
4. Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff 
members, the County Commission approved the rezoning. Envelope 5, document 6, pp. 
906-907. The ordinance was published on August 20, 1987. R19. 
5- Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a 
The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask 
for a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County 
Commission without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property. 
3
 Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2. 
3 
rehearing of its zoning decision. R25. That petition reiterated that "[development on 
the property would constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not 
attempted to annex the property to Sandy City as required by §10-2-418, U.C.A. 1953." 
The petition also stated that n[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this 
property contradicts the Little Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for 
rural residential use on the property." R25. 
6. The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit 
City representatives to speak.4 The Commission denied the City's request and directed 
that if the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning 
Commission through the conditional use process. Envelope 5, Documents 8 - 9 . 
7. The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its 
protest to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and 
master plan violations described above. R27-29. When that was unsuccessful, the City 
filed a timely appeal to the County Commission as required by County ordinance.5 
When its protests were rejected there, the City prompdy initiated this action in 
conformance with the process defined by the County Attorney.6 
4
 T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had 
"ample opportunity to present evidence." p. 13. 
5
 R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision). 
"Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not 
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the 
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not t±|e half mile is applicable." Envelope 
5, Document 9, p. 1114. 
4 
2. A sketch of the project site was apparently available at the time of 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS PETITION PRESENTS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS 
OF MUNICIPAL LAW WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN, BUT 
SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
A SALT LAKE COUNTY'S POLICY OF COMPETING WITH CITIES TO 
DELIVER MUNICIPAL SERVICES CREATES SERIOUS GOVERNANCE 
PROBLEMS 
Serious problems impede the delivery of municipal services within Salt Lake 
County. They arise from intergovernmental conflicts and result in the proliferation of 
service districts and attendant taxation inequities. They are summarized as follows: 
1. Service Delivery Impediments. The state legislature recognizes that 
delivery of urban services is critical to citizen safety and the economic welfare of our 
state. Utah counties lack the powers necessary to deliver a full range of municipal 
services.7 Therefore, the Legislature has directed that such services should be dehvered 
through municipal annexation into areas of growth potential or undergoing development 
impact.8 
Despite its lack of municipal powers, Salt Lake County has elected to sponsor 
large-scale unincorporated development -- often along and within city boundaries and 
"islands." Because cities cannot annex so as to create more unincorporated islands,9 
county-approved developments, which resist annexation, can restrict annexation along the 
entire length of a city boundary. 
7
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
8
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401. 
9
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-417(l)(d). 
Conflicts over vital urban services should be resolved through interlocal 
cooperation. Politics have not permitted that to be so. The Legislature has tried to 
help by adopting laws to promote urban planning. However, most of these statutes 
address governmental entities separately within their own classification and miss the 
critical intergovernmental focus. The result has been a hodgepodge of jurisdictions and 
service delivery responsibilities. 
The impact of local competition for territorial control of development is probably 
best illustrated in Sandy City's own erratic boundaries and in the numerous 
unincorporated islands within that City: 
J-215 
SANDY CITY BOUNDARY MAP 
iiijlSLANDS TO BE ANNEXED IF PETITIONED 
^ AREAS TO BE CONSIDERED IF PETITIONED 
H IN DISPUTE R25 
6 
The urban development which is subject to this action was approved by the 
County within one of these unincorporated islands and is marked in red above. There is 
an obvious inefficiency of servicing central Sandy locations from remote County 
facilities. This practice also encourages developers to shop within such islands for the 
most attractive zoning and development standards - annexing where city standards are 
favorable and "going unincorporated" where, as in most cases, County standards are 
lower. As this process occurs, power over local planning subtly shifts into private hands 
where interests are largely site-specific. The long term effect is planning ad hocery and 
frustration of the objectives of local communities as they try to plan for its growth and 
efficiently deliver services to their citizens. 
2. Service District Proliferation. Additional problems result from County 
development policies. The county lacks the constitutional and statutory authority of a 
city and can't meet the full service demands of unincorporated areas. So it has 
encouraged the creation of special purpose districts to help compete with cities for 
development. 
The proliferation of special districts defeats representative government. Districts 
exercise limited functions and operate apart from general units of government. The 
territorial jurisdiction of districts often overlap, creating difficult problems particularly in 
metropolitan areas.10 For these reasons, special district governance has been aptly 
termed the "new dark continent of American politics."11 
10
 Robert W. Swensen, "A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II," 1985 Utah Law Review 1, 48. 
11
 See discussion in Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local Government in the Salt Lake Metropolitan 
Area," 7 Utah Law Review 209, 212-216 (1960). 
7 
The Salt Lake valley poses the most serious problem in Utah. At least twelve 
full-function cities and towns exist in the valley. Salt Lake Couny also engages in the 
delivery of municipal services. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose districts 
have been organized to duplicate municipal functions and complicate the local 
government puzzle: 
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of local 
government attempting to meet the needs of an area whose topography is 
uniform and whose population is constantly becoming more evenly 
distributed as suburbanization makes its rapid advance.12 
3. Taxation Excesses and Inequities. Taxation excesses are of paramount 
public concern. The roots of local taxation problems lie within this maze of 
governments and service delivery roles: 
Are there any logical bases for dividing into special districts 
governmental functions and responsibilities in a relatively compact area 
such as the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area, where nearly half of Utah's 
population is concentrated? A few examples from the report of the Local 
Government Survey Commission, which recently completed a factual study 
of local government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer. 
Unnecessary expenses are incurred because special districts employ their 
own legal counsel, thereby duplicating functions of the city or county 
attorney's office. Expenses are further increased because there is no 
central purchasing authority, and, consequently, none of the economies of 
large-scale purchasing are realized. Duplicate purchases of equipment and 
the necessary maintenance facilities as well as duplication of personnel 
also increase costs. Taxpayers in some instances are subject simultaneously 
to as many as five local government authorities. In such confusion 
taxpayers sometimes do not even receive the specific service the district is 
supposed to provide. For example, in the suburban area southeast of Salt 
Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water from ten private water 
companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the same time are taxed 
by the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, from which they 
receive no water. The compilers of the report felt that the latter situation 
was "close to double taxation," and the inequality of the situation does 
2
 Benson, supra. 
8 
seem obvious."13 
B. THE LEGISLATURE ADOPTED THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
STATUTE TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS 
In 1979, the Utah Legislature declared its intention to eliminate these 
governmental disorders in the following statement of policy. 
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that: 
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic 
development of this state; 
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential pr sound urban development and pr the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in 
areas undergoing development; 
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific 
standards, to include areas where a higi quality of urban governmental 
services is needed and can be provided pr the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation and the 
proliferation of special service districts; 
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate 
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing 
municipality, subject to Section 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the 
annexation; 
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents 
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government; 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban 
development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of 
the proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other 
governmental entities, on the need for and cost of local government 
services and the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, 
and on factors related to population growth and density and the geography 
of the area; and 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens 
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state 
responsibility. 
13
 Id., p. 212. 
This important policy finally addressed the problem of competition by counties 
for new development. It emphasized that urban development is the responsibility of 
municipalities, which have the statutory authority to provide a full range of urban 
services. Municipal annexation is defined as the means to promote such policy and 
eliminate the evils of service district proliferation and double taxation. 
This policy was accompanied by the introduction to a comprehensive planning 
law. This new law was unlike prior planning statutes in that it finally addressed the 
problem of competition between cities and counties for urban development. Central to 
that new law is §10-2-418, which states that "[u]rban development shall not be approved 
or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area which the 
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration."14 
The effect of this statute is to restrict counties from expanding their tax base 
adjacent to cities and in unincorporated islands and thus reopen such territories to 
annexation. Although this policy does not implement all aspects of legislative policy in a 
single stroke, it at least limits growth of the problem and begins a critical evolution away 
from self-destructive intergovernmental competition. 
Revenue-conscious counties can't be expected to enforce the urban development 
statute on their own. To be effective, this restriction must be judicially honored. 
Without such aid from the courts, legislative intentions will be vitiated while service 
delivery is retarded, urban planning is frustrated, service districts proliferate, and 
taxation inequities continue unabated. 
"Urban development" is defined to include Ma commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases." UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11). 
10 
C. THE PANEL'S DECISION ROBS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
STATUTE OF ITS EFFECT BY CREATING IMPOSSIBLE BARRIERS TO 
ITS ENFORCEMENT. THE EFFECT IS TO UNDO STATE LEGISLATION 
AND DO SERIOUS DAMAGE TO LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. 
The Appeal Court Panel ruled that cities cannot object to county approval of 
urban development adjacent to their boundaries unless they have previously exhausted 
an attack on the underlying zoning. The Panel stated: 
Even though Sandy City, in its master policy declaration, had 
indicated its interest in annexing the property should the property owners 
so petition, the property owners never petitioned, nor did Sandy City 
attempt to annex the property on its own. Further, it did not appeal the 
county's initial zoning decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9-9 
(1986), and raise this issue at that time. Instead, it waited to raise the 
issue on the subsequent grant of the conditional use permit, where the 
relevant issues do not include the proposed use of the land or any 
annexation issue, but only whether the proposed use comports with the 
previously enacted zoning regulations and county master plan. Because 
Sandy City could and should have raised this issue earlier, we find that it is 
precluded from raising it now.15 
The Panel misconstrued the record in concluding that the City did not timely 
appeal the rezoning decision.16 The Panel's conclusion also contains a legal error. It 
implies that if the underlying zoning of an area has not been appealed, that subsequent 
county approvals cannot be challenged. 
This legal conclusion relies on §10-9-9 of the Utah Municipal Code. That section 
specifies an appeal procedure to city boards of adjustment from enforcement decisions17 
by city officials. The Municipal Code has no application whatsoever to counties.18 
15
 Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
See discussion under Point IV. 
17
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-12(1). 
18
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
11 
The effect is to redefine the urban development statute to permit any 
unincorporated development on previously zoned land regardless of its cost or scale. 
Cities presented with this new requirement will be powerless to comply, since 
most county lands are already zoned. Even with new zoning proposals, the development 
is often not defined so as to give cities a factual basis upon which to conclude that costs 
will exceed the $750,000 jurisdictional limit. 
The result is that the Panel's decision creates impossible barriers to enforcement 
of the urban development statute in a manner which robs it of its intended meaning. 
The effect of the decision is to undo the express language of a statute of critical 
importance to the welfare of our state. 
POINT II 
THE APPEAL COURT PANEL AVOIDED CRITICAL ISSUES 
BY APPLYING A STANDARD OF REVIEW IN CONFLICT 
WITH STANDARDS ADOPTED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
A. THE PANEL FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE 
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area 
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration." 
"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for 
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."19 
The central issue in this action has been whether respondents' development 
exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the County of approval authority. The 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986). 
12 
County Director of Development Services, testifying before the Planning Commission, 
confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure."20 
Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that their costs for just the first two 
pads was $760,000.21 A later MAI appraisal showed that the costs of the entire 
development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development restriction.22 
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this 
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. Despite the testimony of 
the developers and its own staff, it found that development costs were less than 
$750,000. 
On appeal, the Panel acknowledged that it could consider whether the County 
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.23 It 
cited Nayior v. Salt Lake City Corporation24 for the proposition that the Panel should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue. 
The Nayior case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of 
the City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he 
statutory authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and 
amending the same is not questioned" in that case.25 Thus the Nayior court merely 
2 0
 Ri l l . 
21
 R108. 
22
 R133-135. 
Opinion, p. 11. 
24
 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965). 
2 5
 /d., at p. 28. 
13 
confirmed that courts should not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative 
discretion. 
B. THE COURT APPLIED A STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE 
TO DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND NOT 
TO QUESTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT JURISDICTION. 
Statutory authority is the central issue in this appeal. Jurisdictional issues are not 
discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks 
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized 
only where counties act within their authority: 
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of 
the applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or 
deny conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within 
the boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority 
is afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a 
strong presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, 
courts will not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, 
unreasonable or an abuse of discretion."26 
The review standard applied by the Panel reverses the proper role of the courts. 
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, they becomes the validators of 
the same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of 
evidence which consistently denies them such powers. The Panel could not have 
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests 
that this Court consider the review standard the Panel so broadly applied in this appeal. 
2 6
 Thurston v. Cache Cty, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will 
be granted under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the 
scope of its authority." 
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POINT III 
THE PANEL ALSO AVOIDED THE ISSUES BY 
HOLDING AS DETERMINATIVE, STATUTES WHICH 
HAVE NO APPLICATION TO THIS ACTION 
A THE MUNICIPAL CODE HAS NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER 
TO COUNTY REZONINGS. 
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code as a basis 
for its refusal to review the merits of this appeal.27 These statutes have no application 
to this appeal for the following reasons: 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a basis for its 
conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.28 This 
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to 
city board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials. This section has 
nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be 
applied to this case.29 
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. 
It addresses only to appeals from enprcement decisions and does not authorize the 
board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones themselves. Further, this section does 
not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals. Section 10-9-9 is facially 
inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the basis to avoid consideration of 
Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix MA.H 
Opinion, p. 43. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A." 
2 9
 See Davis County v. Qearfeld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where the Court of 
Appeals rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to 
municipal planning matters. 
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the merits of this appeal. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also apparently used to establish 
that the City had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's 
rezoning.30 This section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing 
decisions by city boards of adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part 
of the Utah Municipal Code and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities 
for the purposes of that code and this section has nothing to do with County zoning 
decisions whatsoever.31 Even if it did apply to counties, it does not purport to establish 
a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning decisions. 
B. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES RELIED ON BY THE 
COURT HAVE DO NOT GOVERN REZONING DECISIONS BY ELECTED 
COUNTY OFFICIALS. 
Section 17-27-16 of the enabling act for counties was also cited by the Panel to 
establish that "an appeal from a zoning decision must be made within the time and 
according to the procedure specified by the board of county commissioners."32 As 
discussed in Point IV below, the City precisely followed County directions in appealing 
the rezoning decision. 
Section 17-27-16 actually provides a procedure for appealing alleged errors in 
zoning enforcement decisions to the board of adjustment. The record does not disclose 
whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board of adjustment. If it has, that 
Opinion, p. 39. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A.M 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A." 
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board does not review rezonings.33 Its powers are expressly limited to considering 
alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning resolution."34 
The City does not allege an error in zoning enprcement. It attacks the 
jurisdiction of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional 
use permit. As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been 
applied to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal.35 
POINT IV 
THE PANEL'S DECISION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF 
BRIEFING AND ARGUMENT AND CALLS FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE 
SUPREME COURTS POWER OF SUPERVISION TO CORRECT 
RESULTING ERRORS 
A THE PANEL MISCONSTRUED THE FACTUAL RECORD 
CONCERNING SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT 
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's 
rezoning but erroneously states that "there is no dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal 
the rezoning" pursuant to §17-27-16. That conclusion arose partly from the lack of 
briefing or argument and the misconstruction of §17-27-16 discussed above. However, a 
misunderstanding of the factual record is also implied in the conclusion. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that (1) the City raised its development 
objections prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was 
not available to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the 
3 3
 Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & 
Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); Ga)iand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 
635 (1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976). 
3 4
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added. 
3 5
 Thurston, supra^p. 446, confirms that the board of adjustment is not "the exclusive repository of appellate 
powers." 
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City's objection; (3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may 
violate urban development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the 
property, deferring its decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the 
development until a specific development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested 
reconsideration of the County's decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was 
denied and the City was directed to pursue its objection through the conditional use 
process; (7) the City complied with the County's direction and fully participated at all 
stages of the conditional use process as defined by ordinance; and (8) through this 
action, the City timely appealed the rezoning and conditional use permits in the manner 
defined by the County Attorney. 
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this 
development. The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative 
appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally 
in the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its 
objections in a timely fashion at each stage. 
Where the parties have agreed on an appeal procedure which is consistent with 
all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes unfairness to refuse rudimentary 
discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis that an alternative procedure 
was not selected. The Court would advance justice by providing the same presumption 
to the County's defined grievance procedure as the Panel did to all other aspects of the 
County's decisions. The Panel's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record 
of these events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process. 
18 
B. THE PANEL ALSO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT COUNTY 
FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County 
had made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."36 This 
conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that 
development costs for the site would exceed $750,000: 
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County 
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to 
day, however, the value of the development is determined when the 
building permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people 
to purchase a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid 
annexation. In this particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire 
site is developed it will exceed the $750,000 figure. This legal issue will have 
to be addressed with the cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy 
City."37 
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that 
their costs for just the first twD of numerous building pads was $760,000.38 No evidence 
was introduced to refute this testimony.39 The County's findings therefore directly 
contradict the undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was 
misplaced. The court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts 
contained in the record on appeal. 
* Opinion, p. 14. 
3 7
 Ri l l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13. 
3 8
 Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10. 
3 9
 R1Q8. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not 
address costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's 
findings even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that 
a residuum of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is 
discussed on p. 18 of Appellant's reply brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Panel's detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted in 
several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, would materially alter the Panel's 
decision. A motion for rehearing has been unsuccessful before the Court of Appeals. 
Accordingly, this petition is presented to the Supreme Court in an effort to settle the 
important questions of municipal law which have be'en raised by the Panel's decision. 
Those questions are central to the ability of local communities to efficiently deliver vital 
urban services to their residents and to implement their goals and objectives through 
their elected officials. 
DATED thi<P day of September, 1990. 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
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APPENDIX "A" 
10-1-104. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, 
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, 
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not in-
clude counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments. 
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the 
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the 
city commission; 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city coun-
cil; 
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council. 
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class 
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities. 
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301. 
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to 
town clerks. 
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah 
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipal-
ity unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law. 
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of 
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street, 
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or 
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality, 
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state. 
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity 
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service de-
livery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed 
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity. 
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded 
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by 
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn 
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorpo-
rated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggre-
gate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by 
incorporated area of one or more municipalities. 
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving 
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases. 
10-2-401. Legislative policy. 
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that: 
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic 
development of this state; 
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial 
areas, and in areas undergoing development; 
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with spe-
cific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban govern-
mental services is needed and can be provided for the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation 
and the proliferation of special service districts; 
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate 
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing munici-
pality, subject to § 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the annexation; 
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents 
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government; 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban develop-
ment need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of the 
proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other govern-
ment entities, on the need for and cost of local government services and 
the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and on 
factors related to population growth and density and the geography of the 
area; and 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens 
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state responsi-
bility. 
10-2-418. Urban development restrictions. 
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile 
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the stan-
dards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a 
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said one-
half mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and iden-
tify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation 
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with 
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by 
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise 
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality 
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an 
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act. 
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled — 
Transmission of papers. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by 
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of 
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is 
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers con-
stituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. 
10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limita-
tion. 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the 
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
17-27-16. Appeals — Powers of board. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
by his inability to obtain a building permit, or by the decision of any adminis-
trative officer or agency based upon or made in the course of the 
adminstration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution. Ap-
peals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any officer, department, 
board or bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a building 
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency based on or 
made in the course of the administration or enforcement of the provisions of 
the zoning resolution. The time within which such appeal must be made, and 
the form or other procedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the gen-
eral rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to govern 
the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the supplemental rules of 
procedure adopted by such board provided further, that said rules and regula-
tions shall be available to the public at the office of the county commissioners 
at all times. 
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall have the following powers: 
(1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that 
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by 
administrative official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of 
the zoning resolution. 
(2) To hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such 
resolution, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map 
or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is 
authorized by any such resolution to pass. 
(3) Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of 
a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation, 
or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary 
and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict 
application of any regulation enacted under this act would result in pecu-
liar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue 
hardships upon, the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal 
relating to said property, a variance from such strict application so as to 
relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief may be granted 
without substantial detriment to the public good and without substan-
tially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning reso-
lutions. 
The concurring vote of four members of the board in the case of a five-
member board, and of three members in the case of a three-member board, 
shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or determina-
tion of any such administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the 
aonellant. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial court's 
dismissal of its action against defendants Salt 
Lake County, property owners Yeates, Priest, 
Kjar, and Smoot, and developers Postero-
Blecker, Inc. (Postero-Blecker) and Chevron 
USA, Inc. (Chevron). We affirm the trial i 
court's dismissal of Sandy City's action. 
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of 
commercial property located on the northwest 
corner of 10600 South and 1300 East in uni-
ncorporated Salt Lake County. The property 
abuts Sandy City's boundaries and is located 
within an unincorporated "island" within 
Sandy City's limits. Since 1976, the county 
master plan and Sandy City plans have called 
for rural residential uses of the property. 
In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general 
annexation policy declaration which, among 
other things, delineated twenty-one uninco-
rporated islands within the city boundaries 
which Sandy City was willing to annex, incl-
uding the present parcel. According to Sandy 
City, this policy declaration requires property 
owners to first attempt to annex to Sandy 
City, thereby obviating the County's approval 
for development of commercial propertv when I 
It Lake County com «c 
lv. Rviv 3S P I P » O . IMi 
the development cost is in excess of S750,OOO. 
On August 5, 1987, at the property owner; 
request, the Salt Lake County Commissior 
without amending its master plan, adopted 
zoning ordinance which permitted commerci; 
development on the present property. Sand 
City objected to the rezoning but failed t 
appeal the decision.1 
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker, tli 
agent for the property owners and Chevror 
applied to Salt Lake County for a condition; 
use permit to build a Chevron service statioi 
car wash, and mini-convenience store on . 
acres of the property. This application indi< 
ated that the estimated value of the proje< 
was $250,000. The property owners also int< 
nded to build a McDonald's restaurant on tl 
property. On September 30, 1987, they file 
another conditional use permit applicatic 
which valued the McDonald's project « 
approximately 5300,000. The property ownei 
did not petition to annex the property t 
Sandy City. 
On September 18, 1987, Sandy City prot 
sted the Chevron application, indicating th; 
"Sandy City is currently considering annex; 
tion of the property and the annexation w: 
require an independent consideration < 
proper zoning for this property." It also un 
uccessfully petitioned the Salt Lake Coun 
Commission to reconsider and amend its pr 
viously passed zoning ordinance. 
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake Coun 
Planning Commission approved the Chevrc 
conditional use application. On October 1 
1987, Sandy City appealed this decision. Tl 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission, fc 
lowing several public hearings, denied Sane 
City's appeal and entered findings of fact. 
Sandy City then appealed the condition 
use decision to the Salt Lake County Comr 
ission, which held a hearing on December 
1987. The Salt Lake County Commissic 
affirmed the Salt Lake County Plannir 
Commission's grant of the Chevron condii 
or:"1 use permit, finding that the requin 
statu lory procedure had been followed ai 
that the grant of the conditional use pern-
was in the community's interest. Sandy Ci 
then brought this action in the district court. 
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake Coun 
filed with the district court the affidavit < 
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Plannii 
Commission's administrative assistant, ai 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Plannii 
Commission's September 22 and October 1 
1987 meetings, at which Chevron's condition 
use permit application had been discussed ai 
interested parties had presented evidene 
Subsequently, Sandy City submitted an af 
davit indicating that the projected cost o\~ t 
Chevron development was between $660,0 
to S760.000, and that the cost of the McD 
nald 's development would be betwe< 
| S900,0(K) and SI, 100,000. Simultaneously, S; 
s'CK RKPOR7S UTAH ADVA? 
mi •<<> JSandy City v. Sal 
>"'. < ' ^ 1 3 6 U t a h A d 
ike County submitted the minutes of the 
pril 28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake 
Dunty Planning Commission, which involved 
scussion of the zoning change, along with 
elen Christiansen's authenticating affidavit. 
11 parties moved for summary judgment. 
Sandy City then moved to strike Salt Lake 
aunty's affidavits, alleging that they failed 
conform to the requirements of rule 56(e) 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron 
sponded by filing an affidavit indicating that 
e building value of the proposed Chevron 
ttionwasS175,000. 
On February 4, 1988, the day before the 
aring on Salt Lake County's motion for 
mmary judgment, Sandy City's attorney 
)ved for additional discovery time pursuant 
rule 56(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proc-
ure. 
During the hearing on February 5, 1988, 
It Lake County requested permission to 
roduce into evidence the certified record of 
*. administrative hearings. These records 
:luded the previously submitted commission 
nutes, with additional maps and supporting 
iterials. Sandy City's counsel objected, 
ting that he did not know what the admi-
trative record contained and, thus, the 
ord was prejudicial. The district court 
»rruled Sandy City's objection and allowed | 
: record to be entered into evidence. On 
?ruary 19, 1988, Salt Lake County submi-
i the minutes of the December 9, 1987 
eting of the Salt Lake County Commission, 
itaining the appeal of the conditional use 
mit grant, along with the administrative 
istant's supporting affidavit. 
>alt Lake County filed the complete certi- i 
i administrative record with the district 
irt on March 3, 1988. On March 15, 1988, j 
district court entered its decision, finding 
t the Salt Lake County Planning Commis- | 
i had properly issued the conditional use I 
mit, and that defendants' actions did not | 
late the annexation statute, Utah Code 
n. § 1 0 - 2 - 4 1 8 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . It granted | 
imary judgment in favor of defendants and 
-nissed Sandy City's action. Subsequently, 
idy City unsuccessfully moved for an inj-
:tion on the development of the property 
ing the pendency of the appeal. It then 
ught this appeal. 
)n appeal, Sandy - City challenges the 
imary judgment, first arguing that there 
e substantial issues of material fact making 
imary judgment improper because: (1) Salt 
;e County untimely submitted the admins-
ive record in violation of rule 6(d) of the 
;h Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) Salt Lake 
inty's administrative record and affidavits 
e untimely filed in violation of rule 56 of 
Utah Rules o( Civil Procedure; (3) the 
davits and other evidence presented by 
:vron violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules 
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate 
evidentiary foundation; (4) the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule 
56(f)-motion for further discovery; and (5) 
there were substantial issues of material fact in 
the record. Sandy City's second major assig-
nment of error is that the trial court erroneo-
usly interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§10-2-
418 and 10-1-4(11) (1986) by ruling that (1) 
to preclude urban development of the property 
at issue, Sandy City had to formally declare its 
intention to annex it prior to the occurrence of 
the events leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the 
Chevron development, and possibly the 
McDonald's development, did not constitute 
"urban development" under section 10-1-
4(11). 
I. FACTUAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
Before we address Sandy City's contentions, 
however, it is necessary to examine the scope 
of our review in cases dealing with summary 
judgment and municipal zoning issues.2 
In reviewing a summary judgment, an 
appellate court "considers] the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirm[s] only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issues of 
fact, or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 
(UtahCt. App. 1987). 
It is well established in Utah that "courts of 
law cannot substitute their judgment in the 
area of zoning regulations for that of the 
[municipality's] governing body." Naylor v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 
P.2d 27, 29 (1965) (footnote omitted). Instead, 
the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude 
of discretion to administrative bodies charged 
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as 
endowing their actions with a presumption of 
correctness and validity, because of the com-
plexity of factors involved in the matter of 
zoning and the specialized knowledge of the 
administrative body. Cottonwood Heights 
Citizen Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 
138, 140 (Utah 1979). Thus, the courts will not 
consider the wisdom, necessity, or advisability 
or otherwise interfere with a zoning determi-
nation unless "it is shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Id. 
In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann. §10-
9-15 (1986) indicates that an aggrieved party 
may "maintain a plenary action for relief" 
from any decision of the municipal body 
within thirty days of the filing of the decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]he 
statutory language 'plenary action tor relief 
therefrom' presupposes the continued exist-
ence of the administrative action, thus sugge-
sting an appeal rather than a trial de novo." 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 
1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). However, "[t]he 
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nature and extent of tlie review depends on 
what happened below as reflected hy a true 
record of the proceedings, viewed in the light 
of accepted due process requirements." Denver 
<£ Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Central Weber 
Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 
P.2d 8S4, 887 (1955). The supreme court also 
found, in Xanthos, that where a hearing has 
proceeded in accordance with due process 
requirements, the reviewing court can look 
only to the record, which consists of the 
hearing minutes along with the formal findings 
and order. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. 
However, where no record is preserved, and 
there is, consequently, nothing to review, the 
reviewing court may take evidence. Id. While 
this evidence is not necessarily limited .to the 
evidence presented below, the reviewing court 
may not retry the case on the merits or subs-
titute its judgment for that of the municipal 
body. Id. 
Because an administrative record has been 
preserved in the present circumstance, we find 
that this matter should be reviewed on the 
record, and that a de novo trial is inappropr-
iate. 
Under these standards of review, we now 
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial 
court improperly granted summary judgment 
on evidentiary issues. 
A. Admission of Administrative Record 
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake 
County untimely submitted the administrative 
record in violation of rule 6(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues that rule 
6(d) requires supporting affidavits to be sub-
mitted at the time a party files a motion for 
summary judgment, and that the administra-
tive record is analogous to a supporting affi-
davit. Because the County submitted the 
administrative record during the hearing on 
the motion for summary judgment, rather 
than beforehand, and, consequently, failed to 
give Sandy City notice of the contents of the 
record, Sandy City concludes that the trial 
court should not have considered the evidence 
contained in this record in arriving at its 
summary judgment. On the other hand, the 
County argues that the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not set forth any specific procedure 
for certifying an administrative record from a 
county commission to the district court, so 
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it deals 
only with the filing of affidavits. 
In relevant part, rule 6(d) states: 
When a motion is supported by an 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion; and, except 
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), 
opposing affidavits may be served 
not later than 1 day before the 
hearing, unless the court permits 
them to be served at some other 
time. 
It Lake Countv com • cc 
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Prior to the hearing before the district court 
on February 5, 1988, the County submitted 
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission hearings held on April 28, May 
12, September 22, October 13, and October 
27, 1987, along with authenticating affidavits. 
These minutes contained testimony on all ol 
the disputed issues. The record which the 
County moved to be placed into evidence 
during the district court hearing contained 
these minutes, accompanied by some docum 
entation and a large quantity of plat maps 
but did not add materially to the relevani 
information already before the court. The 
court admitted this record into evidence ovei 
the strenuous objections of Sandy City, stating 
that "everything down there is not essential tc 
a determination of these motions. And I thinl 
that quite apart from this, [even] if the cour 
disregarded this, it will have before it suffic 
ient undisputed facts of law to make decision! 
in the matter." Subsequently, the court adm 
itted into evidence, as part of the record, th< 
minutes of the Salt Lake County Commissioi 
hearing held on December 9, 1987, which hac 
not previously been available, and variou; 
documents that were specifically requested b; 
Sandy City's attorney. 
Our review of the record, including th< 
administrative record submitted to the court 
indicates that if there was any error in admi 
tting the administrative record, it was harmles 
because it was essentially cumulative wit) 
respect to the evidence already before th 
court. Further, some of the subsequent!; 
admitted evidence was admitted at Sand; 
City's request. 
However, we find that the trial court dii 
not err in admitting the administrative recon 
at the time of trial. If we follow rule 6(d) lit 
erally, styling the administrative record as th 
equivalent of an affidavit in support of 
motion for summary judgment, the document 
must be served not later than one day befor 
the hearing unless the court permits them t 
be s.-rved at some other time. The court, the 
refore, has discretion to admit such document 
at other times, including during the hearing 
In this case, the court admitted document 
during and after the hearing, in response t 
requests made by both parties. 
However, there are limitations to this disc 
retion. Although the Utah Supreme Court ha 
found that the notice provisions of rule 6(c 
are not hard and fast, it has stated that a tri; 
court may dispense with technical complianc 
to them only if there is satisfactory proof th< 
a party had "actual notice and time to prepai 
to meet the questions raised by the motion c 
an adversary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2 
423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnoi 
omitted); see also Western States Thrift 
Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 5( 
P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 1 
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ah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962). 
Although Sandy City objected to the adm-
ion of the administrative record on the 
3und that it did not know what it contained 
d, therefore, was unprepared to argue 
ainst it, the trial court properly denied this 
jection because the entire record was a 
itter of public record, had been on file for a 
bstantial period of time prior to the hearing, 
d both parties had access to it. Further, 
nificant portions of the record, in the form 
the commission minutes, were already 
fore the court and Sandy City had ample 
portunity to become familiar with them. We 
d no abuse of discretion in the court's 
ing. 
B. Adequate Evidentiary Foundation 
Sandy City's next claim of error is that the 
Idavits and other evidence presented by 
levron and the other defendants violate rule 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
:ause they lacked an adequate evidentiary 
indation. 
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that 
]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
,de on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
:h facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
i shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
npetent to testify to the matters stated 
rein." Inadmissible evidence cannot be 
isidered in ruling on a motion for summary 
Igment, D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 
), 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments 
State Farm Ins. Co., Ill P.2d 693, 695 
ah Ct. App. 1989); so an affidavit which 
?s not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) is 
rject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank 
Salt Lake, 28 Utah 64, 498 P.2d 352, 353-
(1972); see also Blomquist, 504 P.2d at 
10-21 (an affidavit containing statements 
de only "on information and belief" is 
ufficient and will be disregarded). 
Jandy City moved to strike defendants' 
idavits for their failure to conform to these 
uirements. In its motion to strike, Sandy 
y attacked defendant Chevron's memora-
jm in support of its motion for summary 
gment and the affidavit of Helen J. Chri-
msen, along with its attached exhibits, to 
extent that they were used to establish the 
:gations set forth in Chevron's memora-
lm. 
ielen J. Christiansen's affidavits served to 
iblish that she was the custodian of the 
ord before the Salt Lake County Planning 
mmission and that, on the basis of her 
sonal knowledge, the hearing minutes and a 
»y of McDonald's Corporation's applica-
i for a conditional use permit were the 
reet records of the Salt Lake County Pla-
ng Commission. Under rules 902(4) and 
5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, public 
Drds are admissible as an exception to the 
eral rule excluding hearsay evidence if they 
"certified as correct by the custodian." 
Utah R. Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christ-
iansen's affidavit conformed to rule 56(e) with 
regard to the admission of the exhibits as 
portions of the administrative record before 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. 
As such, they are admissible evidence and are 
not subject to a motion to strike. 
Sandy City challenges various statements 
made in these minutes as being without evid-
entiary foundation. These allegations, 
however, go to the merits of granting the 
conditional use permit and not to any proce-
dural defects. Therefore, we are not concerned 
with them under our standard of review. 
Consequently, we find Sandy City's objections 
to the foundation of statements made in the 
record to be without merit. 
C. Further Discovery 
Sandy City argues that the district court 
erred in refusing to permit it to conduct 
further discovery pursuant to rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(0 
provides that a court may continue a motion 
for summary judgment to permit the moving 
party to obtain affidavits or take depositions. 
Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
Rule 56(f) reads as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that 
he cannot for reasons stated present 
by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or 
may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depos-
itions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order 
as is just. 
It is generally held that rule 56(0 motions 
should be granted liberally to provide adeq-
uate opportunity for discovery, Cox v. 
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984), Cal-
lioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 
841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); because informa-
tion gained during discovery may create 
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment. Downtown 
Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 278 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, courts are 
unwilling to "spare the litigants from their 
own lack of diligence," Callioux, 745 P.2d at 
841 (quoting Heberf v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 
218, 222 (1st Cir. 1984)), so do not grant rule 
56(0 motions when dilatory or lacking in 
merit. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 
764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Downtown Athletic Club, 740 P.2d at 278-
79. 
A rule 56(0 movant must file an affidavit to 
preserve his or her contention that summary 
judgment should be delayed pending further 
discovery. Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841. In this 
affidavit, the movant must explain how the 
requested continuance will aid his or her 
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opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial 
court has discretion to determine whether the 
reasons stated in a rule 56(0 affidavit arc 
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639. 
Sandy City filed an affidavit with the court 
along with its rule 56(f) motion, stating that it 
had been unable to take defendants* deposit-
ions or to obtain a certified copy of certain 
county commission minutes. It indicated that 
it wanted to pursue additional discovery which 
would show that: (1) the proposed use of the 
property contradicted the county master plan 
and that insufficient evidence had been pres-
ented to the County Planning Commission to 
demonstrate conformity with the plan; (2) the 
proposed zoning would not contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood; (3) 
the proposed use would be detrimental to the 
health, safety, and general welfare of persons 
residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope, 
costs, and impact of the development was not 
accurately and fully communicated to the 
county officials during the decision-making 
process; and (5) the costs of the development 
would substantially exceed $750,000. 
To determine whether this affidavit was 
sufficient to merit a rule 56(0 continuance, 
several factors must have been considered: 
(1) Were the reasons articulated in 
the Rule 56(0 affidavit "adequate" 
or is the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought merely 
on a "fishing expedition" for purely 
speculative facts after substantial 
discovery has been conducted 
without producing any significant 
evidence? (2) Was there sufficient 
time since the inception of the 
lawsuit for the party against whom 
the summary judgment is sought to 
use discovery procedures, and 
thereby cross-examine the moving 
party? (3) If discovery procedures 
were timely initiated, was the non-
moving party afforded an approp-
riate response? 
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves, 764 
P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club, 740 
P.2d at 278. 
In determining if Sandy City's request for 
further discovery was meritorious, we first 
consider the relevant standard of review. As 
we noted above, in municipal zoning decis-
ions, the courts do not consider the wisdom, 
necessity, or advisability of particular actions. 
See Sandy City v. City of South Jordan, 652 
P.2d 1316, 1318-19 (Utah 1982). Instead, the 
reviewing court may consider whether the 
municipality acted in conformance with its 
enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant to 
its comprehensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-
29 (1965). The court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the municipality on the 
\i Lake County CODE^CO 
lv. Ken. 38 Provo, Utah 
merits of these issues, however. Id. at 129. 
The trial record contained evidence as to 
Salt Lake County's enabling statutes, ordin-
ances, and plans. It also indicated that the Salt 
Lake County Commission considered evidence 
with respect to all the issues on which Sandy 
City wished to perform additional discovery. 
The Salt Lake County Commission made 
findings of fact going to the merits of these 
issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the 
issues was improper under the standard of 
review, but could properly be held with respect 
to enabling statutes and procedural issues. 
However, there was already substantial evid-
ence on the record regarding the relevant 
enabling statutes and plans. Further, Sandy 
City did not allege in its affidavit that it 
needed additional time to discover procedural 
errors committed by Salt Lake County in 
granting the conditional building permit. 
Therefore, we find that the trial court could 
reasonably conclude that the reasons Sandy 
City articulated in its affidavit would produce 
only cumulative evidence and, so, were inad-
equate to merit a continuance under rule 56(f)-
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time and 
opportunity during the pendency of the action 
before the county commissions to develop and 
present evidence in its favor and to determine 
and refute the defendants' evidence. The 
record indicates that on August 5, 1987, the 
Salt Lake County Commission adopted the 
zoning ordinance allowing commercial devel-
opment on the property at issue, following 
hearings on the issue held in April and May of 
1987. Sandy City objected to the rezoning at 
this time but failed to appeal. On August 26, 
1987, Postero-Blecker applied for the 
Chevron conditional use permit. Sandy City 
protested the application on September 18, 
1987, and subsequently was involved in several 
public hearings on the issue before both the 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission and 
the Salt Lake County Commission, at which it 
had ample opportunity to present evidence. 
Sc*rdy City appealed to the district court in 
December 1987. The hearing on the summary 
judgment motion was finely held on February 
5, 1988, nearly a year after the initial zoning 
hearings had taken place. As stated previously, 
the court will not use a rule 56(0 motion to 
shield the movant from his or her lack of 
diligence. 
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion, 
[t]he mere averment of exclusive 
knowledge or control of the facts 
by the moving party is not adeq-
uate: the opposing party must show 
to the best of his ability what facts 
are within the movant's exclusive 
knowledge or control; what steps 
have been taken to obtain the 
desired information pursuant to 
discovery procedures under the 
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Rules; and that he is desirous of 
taking advantage of these discovery 
procedures. 
illioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J. 
oore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's 
deral Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)). 
ndy City's affidavit did not comply with 
ese requirements. Therefore, we conclude 
at the district court did not abuse its discr-
on in denying Sandy City's rule 56(0 
ation. 
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact 
Sandy City argues that the court failed to 
nsider evidence which created the following 
nuine issues of material fact: (1) Sandy 
ty's willingness to annex, as shown by its 
press declaration in its annexation policy 
claration and its attorney's statements 
fore the Salt Lake County Planning Com-
ssion; (2) that the projected cost of the 
levron project exceeded $750,000, as shown 
a certified appraisal setting the cost as 
tween $660,000 and $760,000; (3) that the 
levron station was only part of a larger 
leme to develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in 
it the Chevron station would take only 1/6 
the parcel, the property owners' represe-
jd that the property would be a "commercial 
^division," and that they would be the sole 
/elopers of the entire tract; (4) that the cost 
• the entire development, excluding the cost 
the land, would exceed $750,000; and (5) 
J development was not in compliance with 
: county master plan and county ordinances 
ich called for rural use of the subject pro-
ty, and would create traffic hazards and 
nning problems. 
vfany of these issues are actually issues of 
t. The only issues of fact are the projected 
it of the project and whether the proposed 
relopment was in compliance with the 
inty master plan and county ordinances. As 
have noted above, these issues were disc-
ed and evidence was presented before the 
mtv commissions, which entered written 
clings and decided them on their merits. 
:ause their findings were supported by evi-
lce, we do not disturb them on review. See 
X Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 
3, 885-86 (Utah Ct. A p p . 1989) 
ministrative agency's factual findings will 
be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary and 
•ricious"). 
II. LEGAL ISSUES 
We next address Sandy City's contention 
t the trial court erred in its interpretation 
I application of Utah Code Ann. §10-2-
: (1986) and §10-1-4(11) (1986). Because 
imary judgment is granted as a matter of 
rather than fact, the appellate court is free 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclus-
s. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 
9 (1989) (per curiam); Parents Against 
ink Drivers v. Gray stone Pines Homeo-
wners Ass'n, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Ct. 
App. 1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 129 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 28, 29 (Ct. App. 1990). 
A. Annexation Procedure 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 prohibits 
urban development "within one-half mile of 
a municipality in the unincorporated territory 
which the municipality has proposed for 
municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if 
a municipality is willing to annex the terri-
tory proposed for such development under the 
standards and requirements set forth in this 
chapter." (Emphasis added.) The parties dis-
agree as to whether Sandy City, to prevent 
urban development in the disputed territory, 
was required under this statute to formally 
declare its intention to annex the territory 
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-414 (1986) req-
uires a municipality, prior to annexing uninc-
orporated territory of more than Five acres, to 
adopt a policy declaration indicating the sta-
ndard under which it is willing to annex the 
territory. Sandy City argues that it expressly 
declared its willingness to annex the property 
before initiation of the present lawsuit by (1) 
promulgating a general policy declaration 
indicating its willingness to annex the prop-
erty, if petitioned, along with twenty other 
parcels; and (2) its counsel's direct statement 
to the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
that it was willing to annex the property. The 
trial court found that Sandy City was obliged 
to make a formal declaration of intent to 
annex, in addition to its general policy decla-
ration, to invoke the protection of section 10-
2-414. 
Even though Sandy City, in its master 
policy declaration, had indicated its interest in 
annexing the property should the property 
owners so petition, the property owners never 
petitioned, nor did Sandy City attempt to 
annex the property on its own. Further, it did 
not appeal the county's initial zoning decision 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9-9 
(1986), and raise this Issue at that time. 
Instead, it waited to raise the issue on the 
subsequent grant of the conditional use 
permit, where the relevant issues do not 
include the proposed use of the land or any 
annexation issue, but only whether the prop-
osed use comports with the previously enacted 
zoning regulations and county master plan. 
Because Sandy City could and should have 
raised this issue earlier, we find that it is pre-
cluded from raising it now. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). As such, we do not 
address the issue of whether Sandy City was 
required under section 10-2-418, in addition 
to its master policy declaration, to officially 
declare its willingness to annex a territory of 
less than five acres.4 Consequently, we find 
Sandy City's objection to be without merit. 
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We affirm the trial court's finding against 
Sandy City on this issue, even though we 
assign a totally different rationale than that 
used by the trial court. See, e.g.. Ostler v. 
Ostler, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 17 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
B. Urban Development 
Utah Code Ann. §10-2-418 (1986) states 
thai "(ujrban development shall not be appr-
oved or permitted within one-half mile of a 
municipality in the unincorporated area which 
the municipality has proposed for municipal 
expansion in its policy declaration." "Urban 
development" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§10-1-104(11) (1986) as "a housing subdi-
vision involving more than 15 residential units 
with an average of less than one acre per res-
idential unit or a commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for any or all phases." 
Pursuant to its objective of preventing the 
proposed development of the disputed terri-
tory, Sandy City argues that the trial court 
erred in finding the value of the proposed 
development did not exceed $750,000 because 
(1) the definition of "urban development" 
under section 10-1-104 includes not only the 
value of the building itself, but also the cost 
of the land and the value of the building fix-
tures; and (2) the $750,000 figure encompasses 
all commercial ventures to be built on the 
disputed territory. Salt Lake County, on the 
other hand, alleges that the only relevant cost 
under the definition is that of the building 
alone and does not include the land and buil-
ding fixtures, and that the $750,000 figure 
applies to each individual development venture 
separately initiated on the property. 
Again, because Sandy City has not made 
any attempt to annex the territory and should 
have raised its objections to urban develop-
ment at the time of the zoning determination 
rather than at the subsequent granting of a 
conditional use permit, we decline to interpret 
this statute. Because the interpretation of 
section 10-2-414 would have no relevance to 
the propriety of the county's grant of a con-
ditional use permit under our standard of 
review, any interpretation we would make 
would be an advisory opinion, which we 
decline to issue under well established stand-
ards of judicial review. See Ringwood v. 
Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where the result in 
the prior action constitutes the full relief 
available to the parties on the same claim, or 
where the issue could and should have been 
litigated in the prior action, the claim is pre-
cluded under the doctrine of res judicata); 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 
32, 33 (Ct. App. 1990) (there is a longstanding 
judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory opi-
nions). Therefore, we find this issue to be 
without merit. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. §17-27-16 (1987), ar 
appeal from a zoning decision must be made withir 
the time and according to the procedure specified bj 
the board of county commissioners. While thes< 
regulations are not a part of this record, there is n< 
dispute that Sandy City failed to appeal the rezoninj 
pursuant to these regulations. 
2. Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes an< 
characterizes some of the issues as annexation 
related, however this appeal is from the grant of i 
conditional use permit, a zoning function. 
3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings state 
in part: 
1. The estimated cost of the develop-
ment is approximately $175,000 
2. This development is consistent with 
the intent of the Salt Lake County 
Master Plan by placing commercial 
development at major intersections 
within the county. The Little Cotton-
wood District Plan was generally inte-
nded to be applicable through 1985 and 
the map is now outdated in this imme-
diate area. Since the adoption of the 
plan in 1976, Sandy City rezoned the 
northeast corner of 10600 South 1300 
East to commercial, which changed the 
character of the intersection. Additional 
commercial development is now appro-
priate at this intersection and is consis-
tent with the existing development app-
roved by Sandy City. 
3. The development will provide 
additional gasoline services which are 
needed and desirable in the neighbor-
hood and community.... 
4. The development is buffered from 
adjacent residential uses by property 
zoned R-M and will not be detrimental 
to the health, safety or general welfare 
of persons residing or working in the 
vicinity or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity. The traffic 
engineer has reviewed and approved the 
application. Upon compliance with the 
conditions required by the Planning 
Commission, the development will be an 
attractive addition to the community. 
5. The proposed use will comply with 
the regulation and conditions of the 
Zoning Ordinance. 
4. We note that the property at issue 
consists of 4.18 acres while section 10-
2-418 applies to parcels consisting of at 
least five acres. Therefore, section 10-2-
418 would be inapplicable in the present 
case. 
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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR PETITION 
The City is appreciative of the attention and courtesy extended by the court to the 
parties at oral argument. However, the court's Opinion, filed one year thereafter, departs 
from both the facts and law argued by the parties and relied upon by the lower court. The 
passage of time and this detour from the refining process of briefing and argument resulted 
in several errors of fact and law which, if corrected, should materially alter this court's 
opinion. 
These errors are not merely technical. They form the basis upon which the merits 
of the entire action were avoided. They are thus fundamental to the rights of the parties. 
They also involve important public policy as set forth more fully herein. Correction of these 
errors will promote principles of justice, sound development and local governance. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this court review the statutes and case law and 
apply them to the actual record as discussed herein, and to grant appellant the opportunity 
for oral argument on such issues as are presented in this petition, as provided in Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH ZONING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTES 
HAVE BEEN MISAPPREHENDED 
A THE COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE JURISDICTIONAL NATURE 
OF THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT STATUTE AND TO APPLY A 
STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLICABLE TO STATUTES OF THAT 
CLASS. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-2-418 (1986) states that "[u]rban development shall not be 
approved or permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the unincorporated area 
which the municipality has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration." 
"Urban development" is defined to include "a commercial or industrial development for 
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases."1 
This statute limits Salt Lake County's jurisdiction territorially as well as in subject 
matter. It expressly forbids the County to "approve or permit" commercial development in 
excess of $750,000 within one-half mile of Sandy City. County ordinances also prohibit the 
County from approving use permits which contradict the master plan.2 
A central issue in Sandy City's appeal from summary judgment by the district court 
is whether respondents' development exceeded $750,000 in costs so as to deprive the 
County of approval authority. The County Director of Development Services, testifying 
before the Planning Commission, confirmed that "when the entire site is developed it will 
exceed the $750,000 figure."3 Developers testifying at that same hearing confirmed that 
their costs for just the first two pads was $760,000.4 A later MAI appraisal showed that the 
costs of the entire development indeed far exceeded the $750,000 urban development 
restriction.5 
Thus, the evidence before the County was entirely consistent - as it is before this 
Court - the costs of the entire project will exceed $750,000. But, Salt Lake County is 
subject to the same tendencies as other large bureaucracies - it seeks to maximize its own 
interests and authority. Despite the testimony of the developers and its own staff, it found 
1
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(11) (1986). 
2
 R22. 
3
 Ri l l . 
4
 R108. 
5
 R133-135. 
2 
that development costs were less than $750,000. 
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that it could consider whether the County 
exceeded its authority under the Urban Development Statute, but refused to do so.6 It 
cited Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation7 for the proposition that the court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the County on the merits of such an issue. 
The Naylor case does not support such a conclusion. The statutory authority of the 
City was not in question there. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that n[t]he statutory 
authority of the City's governing body to enact zoning ordinances and amending the same 
is not questioned" in that case.8 Thus the Naylor court merely confirmed that courts should 
not ordinarily interfere with matters of administrative discretion. 
Statutory authority is the central issue in the instant appeal. Jurisdictional issues are 
not discretionary and judicial deference has no proper place where the County lacks 
authority to act. The Supreme Court has confirmed that review latitude is recognized only 
where counties act within their authority: 
"County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and standards of the 
applicable zoning ordinances, and are not at liberty either to grant or deny 
conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards. Within the 
boundaries established by such standards, however, the zoning authority is 
afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and its decisions are afforded a strong 
presumption of validity. Where such decisions have been made, courts will 
not interfere unless they are plainly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable or an 
abuse of discretion."9 
6
 Opinion, p. 11. 
7
 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Utah 1965). 
8
 Id., at p. 28. 
9
 Thurston v. Cache Ctyy 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 (Utah 1981). Emphasis added. See also Peatross v. Board 
of County Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), where the Court made clear that deference will be granted 
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard only if the lower agency was "acting within the scope of its 
authority." 
3 
There is hardly a more important issue before any court than the unlawful use of 
governmental power. Courts have been established to check such excesses. Salt Lake 
County and its planning commission are agencies of limited jurisdiction. Their "authority" 
is dependent entirely upon the terms of the statutes reposing power in them. They cannot 
confer jurisdiction on themselves by making findings contrary to the evidence before them. 
If the mandatory provisions of their enabling statutes are not met, they have no authority 
to proceed. 
The review standard applied in this appeal reverses the proper role of the courts. 
Instead of serving as a check on governmental excesses, it becomes the validator of the 
same. It permits administrative agencies to define their own powers in the face of evidence 
which consistently denies them such powers. The Court of Appeals could not have 
intended to play such a role or create such a profound precedent. The City requests that 
the court reconsider the review standard it so broadly applied in this appeal. 
B. THE MUNICIPAL CODE AND BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT STATUTES 
RELIED ON BY THE COURT HAVE NO APPLICATION WHATSOEVER TO 
REZONINGS BY ELECTED COUNTY OFFICIALS. 
The court cited two statutes selected from the Utah Municipal Code and one statute 
from the enabling act for counties, as the basis for its refusal to review the merits of this 
appeal.10 These statutes have no application to this appeal for the following reasons: 
UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16. This statute was cited to establish that "an appeal 
from a zoning decision must be made within the time and according to the procedure 
Copies of each of these statutes are attached as Appendix "A." 
4 
specified by the board of county commissioners."11 More specifically, this section provides 
a procedure for appealing alleged errors in zoning enforcement decisions to the board of 
adjustment. 
The record does not disclose whether Salt Lake County has ever appointed a board 
of adjustment. If it has, its members are not elected officials - they are appointed by the 
county commission.12 For this reason, they do not review zoning decisions.13 Their powers 
are expressly limited to considering alleged errors "in the enprcement of the zoning 
resolution."14 
The City does not allege an error in zoning enforcement. It attacks the jurisdiction 
of the County to adopt the zone itself and to issue the attendant conditional use permit. 
As such, Section 17-27-16 has no application and should not have been applied to avoid 
consideration of the merits of this appeal. 
The Appellate Court's interpretation also contravenes Utah case law. For instance, 
the Utah Supreme Court has approved a county commission's decision to not bestow on the 
board of adjustment the power to issue special zoning exceptions. The county commission 
elected to wield such power on its own. The Court emphasized that "the Board of 
Adjustments is constituted by statute a forum for review of all administrative zoning 
decisions, but nowhere is it made the exclusive repository of appellate powers."15 
11
 Opinion, footnote 1. A copy of this statute appears on Appendix "A." 
12
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-15. 
13
 Zoning is generally considered to be an act which is legislative in nature. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724, 725 (1939); Gayiand v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 635 
(1961); CrestviewHolladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engl Fiord Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976). 
14
 UTAH CODE ANN. 17-27-16(1). Emphasis added. 
Thurston, supra, p. 446. Emphasis added. 
5 
Serious problems will result if the instant interpretation remains. The Court's 
conclusion that zoning challenges must pursue board of adjustment appeal transfers 
legislative policy-making powers from the elected officials of the County to a board which 
is not responsible to the electorate. Such a construction poses immense governance 
problems and promotes conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities as 
articulated by their elected representatives. Under the restrictive standard of review 
imposed by the Court in this appeal, the public would have virtually no ability to overturn 
a zoning by such a non-elected body. Such a serious precedent should not have been 
established without some briefing or oral argument by the parties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-9. This statute was cited by the Court as a second basis 
for its conclusion that the City did not timely appeal the County's zoning decision.16 This 
section is part of the Utah Municipal Code. It establishes a procedure for appeals to city 
board of adjustments from administrative decisions by city officials. This section has 
nothing to do with appeals from county zoning decisions whatsoever and should not be 
applied to this case.17 
Even if this section were somehow to relate to counties, it does not apply here. Like 
the County's board of adjustment statute,18 it addresses only to appeals from enforcement 
decisions and does not authorize the board of adjustment to invalidate the actual zones 
themselves. Further, this section does not establish any time limits whatsoever for appeals. 
16
 Opinion, p. 15. A copy of the statute prior to the 1989 amendment is in Appendix "A." 
17
 See Davis County v. Clearfeld City, 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court of Appeals 
rejected a similar attempt to impute the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act to municipal 
planning matters. 
18
 See Section 1, above. 
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Section 10-9-9 is facially inapplicable to this action and should not be used as the 
basis to avoid consideration of the merits of this appeal. Further, application of that 
section in this appeal poses the same legal and governance problems as use of the County 
board of adjustment statute. Its retention in the Court's decision will create a precedent 
of serious consequence. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-9-15. This statute was also used to establish that the City 
had failed to make a timely administrative appeal from the County's rezoning.19 This 
section does set a 30-day appeal period - but it is for appealing decisions by city boards of 
adjustments to the district court. Like section 10-9-9, it is part of the Utah Municipal Code 
and applies only to cities. Counties are not municipalities for the purposes of that code and 
this section has nothing to do with County zoning decisions whatsoever.20 Even if it did 
apply to counties, it does not purport to establish a time-limitation for appeals of rezoning 
decisions. 
The immediate effect of these errors is to deny the parties consideration of 
the merits of this appeal. The long-term effect is greater. If permitted to stand, this 
decision will create confusion of governance principles and likely undermine the ability of 
citizens to implement their goals and objectives through their elected officials in many 
communities of our state. 
Opinion, p. 15. A copy of this statute is in Appendix "A." 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-1-104(1). 
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POINT II 
THE FACTUAL RECORD HAS BEEN MISSTATED 
A. SANDY'S OBJECTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT WERE TIMELY AND 
COMPLETE 
The Appeal Court's decision acknowledges that Sandy objected to the County's 
rezoning but states that such objection was untimely and incomplete. That conclusion 
arose partly from misapplication of the statutes discussed in Point I above. However, some 
misconstruction of the factual record was also implied in the conclusion. As shown below, 
the actual appeal record does not support this criticism: 
1. There is no record that the City received notice of the rezoning hearing.21 
The County only provided the City with a copy of the rezoning application and requested 
its recommendation.22 The zoning application omitted the estimate of project value 
required by the application form. But it did admit that the rezoning would not comply 
with the County's current land use plan.23 To this admission, the City's objection added 
that the plan also violated the City's Comprehensive Plan and the Crescent Community 
Citizen's Report.24 
2. There was "not a specific use proposed for the overall properties" at the time 
the application was made25 or when rezoning was considered.26 Value would not be 
Although there is a record of constructive notice to the public. Envelope 5, Doc. 2. 
22
 R15-17. 
2 3
 R15. 
24
 R17. 
25
 R15. 
26
 Envelope 5, Document 6, p. 904. 
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determined until a building permit was actually issued.27 It would have been impossible for 
the City to have estimated the cost of development at that time.28 Even though there was 
no project information available, the City could still inform the County that "[t]he developer 
should seek annexation and zoning from Sandy." This is exactly what the City did.29 
3. At the hearing on the matter, the County Commission was briefed on Sandy's 
objection to the rezoning.30 The Deputy County Attorney advised the Commission that 
there may be a problem with the development meeting the urban development restrictions 
of section 10-2-418 U.C.A., depending on how the development plans were eventually 
presented. He then stated that "Sandy could object to that anyway," presumably at the 
time the plans were submitted.31 
4. Based on representations of the Deputy County Attorney and other staff 
members, the County Commission approved the rezoning.32 The ordinance was published 
on August 20, 1987.33 
5. Within thirty days thereafter, the City petitioned the County for a rehearing 
of its zoning decision.34 That petition reiterated that "[development on the property would 
Ril l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13. 
28
 The proposal was so loose that County staff reported "there is a possibility that the developer will ask for 
a different zone depending on the market." The zoning was thereupon approved by the County Commission 
without any knowledge of actual uses to be placed on the property. 
29
 R17. 
30
 Envelope 5, Document 6. 
31
 Id., p. 906. 
3 2
 Id., pp. 906-907. 
3 3
 R19. 
9 
constitute 'urban development' and that the property owners had not attempted to annex 
the property to Sandy City as required by 10-2-418, U.C.A 1953." The petition also stated 
that "[t]he granting of the RM/zc and C-2 zoning on this property contradicts the Little 
Cottonwood District Development Plan which calls for rural residential use on the 
property."35 
6. The County Commission reviewed the City's petition but did not permit City 
representatives to speak.36 The Commission denied the City's request and directed that if 
the City wished to pursue its objection, it should do so before the Planning Commission 
through the conditional use process.37 
7. The City complied with the County Commissions directive and took its protest 
to the Planning Commission raising repeated objections to the statutory and master plan 
violations described above.38 When that was unsuccessful, the City filed a timely appeal to 
the County Commission as required by County ordinance.39 When its protests were rejected 
there, the City promptly initiated this action in conformance with the process defined by the 
County Attorney.40 
35
 id. 
36
 T6. Also, Envelope 5, Document 7, p. 1190. Compare with Opinion which asserts that Sandy had "ample 
opportunity to present evidence." p. 13. 
Envelope 5, Documents 8-9 . 
38R27-29. 
39
 R22. County Ordinance 19.84.110 (Appeal of Planning Commission Decision). 
4
 "Mr. [Kent] Lewis responded if the conditional use is issued because they are convinced that it is not 
covered by the half-mile (sic), then Sandy's option is to seek an injunction agains(sic) the developer and the 
county and a legal determination could be made as to whether or not the half mile is applicable." Envelope 5, 
Document 9, p. 1114. 
10 
The above chronology illustrates that (1) the City raised its development objections 
prior to the County's rezoning hearing; (2) evidence of development costs was not available 
to the City at the time of rezoning and could not have accompanied the City's objection; 
(3) at the time of rezoning, the County understood that the project may violate urban 
development restrictions; (4) the County nevertheless rezoned the property, deferring its 
decision on the legal question and the City's objection to the development until a specific 
development was proposed; (5) the City timely requested reconsideration of the County's 
decision; (6) the request for zoning reconsideration was denied and the City was directed 
to pursue its objection through the conditional use process; (7) the City complied with the 
County's direction and fully participated at all stages of the conditional use process as 
defined by ordinance; and (8) through this action, the City timely appealed the rezoning 
and conditional use permits in the manner defined by the County Attorney. 
Thus, the City was not remiss in raising objections or untimely in appealing this 
development. The court's decision should be corrected to reflect the actual record of these 
events and the merits of the City's appeal should be addressed in that process. 
B. THE COUNTY'S FINDINGS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider any factual issues because the County had 
made findings as to development costs which were "supported by evidence."41 This 
conclusion is inaccurate. As stated above, the County's own staff testified that development 
costs for the site would exceed $750,000: 
"Ken Jones, Director of Development Services, said in the past the County 
has not considered the value of the land because this varies from day to day, 
however, the value of the development is determined when the building 
permit is acquired. He would not want his staff to advise people to purchase 
41
 Opinion, p. 14. 
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a 10 acre parcel, get it zoned, and then cut it up to avoid annexation. In this 
particular case it is safe to assume that when the entire site is developed it will 
exceed the $750,000 figure. This legal issue will have to be addressed with the 
cooperation of Salt Lake County and Sandy City."42 
The developers confirmed that they were in fact cutting up the parcel and that their 
costs for just the first two of numerous building pads was $760,000.43 No evidence was 
introduced to refute this testimony.44 The County's findings therefore directly contradict the 
undisputed evidence and the appeal court's deference to such findings was misplaced. The 
court's decision should be reconsidered in order to state the facts contained in the record 
on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE COURTS DECISION WILL CAUSE 
UNFAIRNESS IF NOT CORRECTED 
The City respectfully suggests that the foregoing errors of law and fact will cause 
unfairness to the parties if not corrected. The following are examples of this effect: 
1. The principle basis of the court's ruling was not raised as an affirmative 
defense by any of the parties to this action, nor was it ever briefed, argued, or considered 
by the parties, the agencies, or lower court. Thus, the parties have been entirely deprived 
of the opportunity to address the issue upon which their rights were determined. 
Ril l . Also, Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 13. 
4 3
 Envelope 4, Document 6, p. 10. 
44
 R108. Chevron agents did make statements as to costs on the first pad. However, they did not address 
costs for the entire development. Further, such statements were without foundation and the County's findings 
even as to that pad violated the "residuum of competent evidence rule." Utah courts have held that a residuum 
of competent legal evidence must support findings of an administrative agency. This rule is discussed on p. 18 
of Appellant's reply brief. 
12 
2. The court's decision that the City should have followed some alternative 
appeal procedure is contrary to the procedures outlined by the County to the City orally in 
the record and by ordinance. The City followed all those procedures and made its 
objections in a timely fashion at each stage. Where the parties have agreed on an appeal 
procedure which is consistent with all applicable statutes and ordinances, it promotes 
unfairness to refuse rudimentary discovery and, in fact, to invalidate an action on the basis 
that an alternative procedure was not selected. The court would advance justice by 
providing the same presumption to the County's defined grievance procedure as it has to 
all other aspects of the County's decisions. 
3. The court's decision to permit a local government to submit massive amounts 
of evidentiary materials at summary judgment hearings, without advance notice to the 
parties and without permitting a recess to review the same, and after the opposing party has 
completed its briefing and oral argument, creates a precedent certain to undermine the 
ability of future citizens to avoid the ambush inherent in such a procedure.45 
4. To conclude that the City "had sufficient time and opportunity during the 
pendency of the action before the county commissions to develop and present evidence in 
its favor and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence"46 overlooks the fact that the 
proposed projects had not been disclosed or that development costs were otherwise 
The court seems to have assumed that the approximately six inches of documents submitted by the County 
in this action were maintained by the County prior to the action in the same condition as they were presented 
to the district court. That assumption is not supported by the record and is not accurate. The record was 
assembled by the County from numerous sources for purposes of the summary judgment hearing. Some 
selectivity is inherent in such a process as evidenced by the fact that the record was determined to be incomplete 
when presented and had to be supplemented. If the county attorney was unable to locate all the relevant records 
for the hearing it is difficult to see how a citizen of the county can be assumed to have complete advance 
knowledge of the same. 
46
 Opinion, p. 13. 
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unavailable from the developers. It was the County, not the City, which failed in its burden 
to require evidence of project costs and compliance with the master plan, so as to establish 
a competent basis for its jurisdiction to proceed.47 
5. When the City was finally able to obtain a professional cost appraisal on its 
own, demonstrating that the development would surely exceed $750,000, such estimates had 
no effect on the County's decision to proceed with its approvals.48 To permit County 
jurisdiction to be upheld solely on statements without competent evidentiary foundation 
encourages the County to continue to ignore competent evidence when presented, contrary 
to the facts and in its self interest. 
6. The court's conclusion that zoning challenger must pursue appeals to boards 
of adjustment has the effect of transfering legislative policy-making powers from the elected 
officials of the County to a board which is not responsible to the electorate. Such a 
construction undermines representative government and separation of powers principles. 
It also promotes administrative conflicts with the goals and objectives of local communities 
as articulated by their elected representatives. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant thanks the court for the extensive time it has taken to review this 
case and the courtesy provided to the parties at oral argument. However, on the basis of 
the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that there are significant factual and 
County ordinance 19.84.090 places the evidentiary burden on the county to demonstrate conformance with 
the intent of the county master plan. R22. 
48 
Envelope 1, Document 11, p. 1389. (McDonald Appeal) 
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legal issues which compel a reconsideration of the court's decision. The Appellant also 
believes that oral argument is appropriate in the circumstances as provided for in Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY 
I, Walter R. Miller, attorney of record for Petitioner and Appellant, certify that this 
petition is filed and presented in good faith and not for any purpose of delay. 
Walter R. Miller 
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APPENDIX " A " 
10-9-9. Appeals to board — Time — Persons entitled — 
Transmission of papers. 
Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrieved 
or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality affected by 
any decision of the administrative officer. Such appeal shall be taken within a 
reasonable time as provided by the rules of the board by filing with the officer 
from whom the appeal is taken and with the board of adjustment a notice of 
appeal specifying the grounds thereof. The officer from whom the appeal is 
taken shall forthwith transmit to the board of adjustment all the papers con-
stituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken. 
10-9-15. Judicial review of board's decision — Time limita-
tion. 
The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of 
competent jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is presented to the 
court within thirty days after the filing of such decision in the office of the 
board. 
17-27-15. Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings. 
The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regu-
lations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a board of adjustment 
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such 
members. Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time 
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners 
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of 
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the 
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of 
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners 
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for 
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appoint-
ments. The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of 
such board, and in the event that any regular member be temporarily unable 
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the 
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary 
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose. 
The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning or 
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, and 
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsistent 
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supple-
mental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rules. 
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provide 
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to appropri-
ate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in the 
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regula-
tions in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commissioners 
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps and 
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or similar 
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulations. 
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairman 
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. The 
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths and 
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjustment 
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings 
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing to 
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and other 
official actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of the 
board and shall be a nublic record. 
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Sandy City, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Salt Lake County, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah; Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission; K. Delyn Yeates; 
R. Scott Priest; W. Scott Kjar; 
Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, 
Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 880429-CA 
Salt Lake County Third 
District Court C87-07304 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 26, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this _[£_ 1- 4* day cf August, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
/ 
Mary T.VNoonan, Clerk 
